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A Response to Appleton and Pollak 
I. Glenn Cohen & Daniel L. Chen† 
We view Professor Appleton and Professor Pollak’s re-
sponse to our article, Trading-Off Reproductive Technology and 
Adoption: Does Subsidizing IVF Decrease Adoption Rates and 
Should It Matter?, as “complementary” in two senses.1 First, 
they are extremely generous with their praise for our project, 
which is particularly gratifying given how important their own 
work has been in the field. Second, and perhaps more im-
portantly, they suggest a number of new tangents and ideas 
prompted by our project. We first summarize those contribu-
tions and how we think they fit with our Article. We then very 
briefly discuss a few instances where we might characterize 
what we have said differently than they do. 
Appleton and Pollak add a number of distinct contributions 
to what we have said. They nicely suggest that the rhetorical 
and legal relationship between embryo adoption and child 
adoption is worth further study.2 While one of us has written 
extensively about reproductive technologies and the legal and 
ethical issues they raise,3 neither in this paper nor in that prior 
 
†  Copyright © 2012 by I. Glenn Cohen & Daniel L. Chen. 
 1. See I. Glenn Cohen & Daniel L. Chen, Trading-Off Reproductive 
Technology and Adoption: Does Subsidizing IVF Decrease Adoption Rates and 
Should It Matter?, 95 MINN. L. REV. 485 (2010). 
 2. Susan Frelich Appleton & Robert A. Pollak, Exploring the Connections 
Between Adoption and IVF: Twibling Analyses, 95 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 
60, 66–69 (2011), http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/ 
05/Appleton-Pollak_PDF.pdf. 
 3. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. _ 
(forthcoming 2012) (proposing substitutes for BIRC analysis); I. Glenn Cohen, 
Intentional Diminishment, The Non-Identity Problem, and Legal Liability, 60 
HASTINGS L.J. 347 (2008) (discussing tort liability for parents who use repro-
ductive technologies to intentionally produce disabled children); I. Glenn Co-
hen, Regulating Reproduction: The Problem with Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. 
REV. 423 (forthcoming 2011) (problematizing best-interests-of-the-resulting-
child (BIRC) analysis by examining it within the context of modern reproduc-
tive technologies); I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to Pro-
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work have we examined embryo adoption—although its omis-
sion in this paper is, in part, a function of the inability to dis-
tinguish it within the CDC data set with which we conduct our 
empirical work. In any event, we wholeheartedly agree with 
Appleton and Pollak that it deserves considerable further 
study. 
At the end of our Article we frame a research agenda based 
on our results: “[W]hy do complete mandates not reduce nonre-
lated domestic or international adoptions?”4 We then offer some 
“speculative possibilities that might be investigated in further 
work, econometric or other,” and suggest that “[m]uch more 
work should be done to examine these (and other) possibili-
ties . . . .”5 We are thus delighted to see the game-theoretic 
modeling in Part II of Appleton and Pollak’s response, which 
attempts to provide exactly such a possible explanation.6 We 
view this kind of modeling as a beneficial and necessary com-
pliment to empirical testing, whereby models are suggested, 
then tested, then dismissed or refined, and so on. 
Third, Pollak and Appleton highlight an important as-
sumption in our Article. As they explain, for our “challenge to 
this theory to have maximum traction, adoption must be a posi-
tive institution with benefits for individual children, society, or 
both. Otherwise, no one would care that IVF subsidies might 
decrease adoptions—the substitution theory would not matter.” 
Additionally, they note our discussion of some arguments 
against international adoption and the absence of an equiva-
lent discussion of why reduced domestic adoptions might be a 
positive thing.7 They are certainly correct that if one thinks 
that domestic adoptions in the U.S. are a bad thing, a possible 
effect where IVF insurance mandates reduce domestic adop-
tions will not be troubling—indeed, perhaps a reduction in do-
mestic adoptions will be welcomed! We viewed the work we did 
in our Article as an attempt to meet those pressing the substi-
tution theory within their own framework (that views domestic 
adoption as a good thing), granting them their own assump-
tions and trying to show that, as normative and empirical mat-
 
create, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1135 (2008) (arguing against a constitutional right not 
to be a genetic parent); I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to be a Genetic Parent?, 
81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115 (2008) (developing a legal framework for analyzing the 
right not to be a genetic parent).  
 4. Cohen & Chen, supra note 1, at 575. 
 5.  Id. at 575–76. 
 6. See Appleton & Pollak, supra note 2, at 72–80. 
 7. Id. at 63–65. 
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ters, their claims against subsidizing IVF may not follow. For 
those who, perhaps like Pollak and Appleton (who do not take 
ownership of this argument, just raise it), accept a more exter-
nal critique that domestic adoption is not a good thing, the case 
against funding IVF is obviously weaker still. Their game-
theoretic modeling also posits that IVF mandates can have in-
come effects, which can lead to an increase in adoption rates.8 
This argument further reduces the case against funding IVF, 
even as an internal critique. 
Thus, we think very highly of Appleton and Pollak’s re-
sponse and think it adds to and extends the research agenda 
we have tried to initiate with our Article. We hope that many 
others follow suit. 
For the sake of crystallizing the issues, though, we shall 
briefly identify a few places where we would characterize our 
argument differently from Appleton and Pollak.  
First, Appleton and Pollak write that we say “nothing to 
challenge the common understanding of adoption as a ‘second 
choice’ or even ‘last resort’ path to parenthood” and that “in ex-
plaining their findings, [we] hypothesize that prospective par-
ents will try IVF before turning to adoption.”9 They appear to 
be referring to a few pages of our Article where we discuss why 
the substitution theory has seemed plausible to its proponents 
by reviewing parts of the existing qualitative literature to 
“show that infertility, and prior attempts at fertility treat-
ments, are associated with considering adoption or actually 
adopting.”10 Their critique culminates with a quotation of Pro-
fessor Appleton’s own work, noting that she has “aptly observed 
in interpreting and summarizing the results of these kinds of 
studies” that “most couples turn to medical treatment when 
first experiencing a fertility problem, reinforcing the ‘second 
best’ or ‘last resort’ status of adoption.”11 It seemed quite clear 
to us that these pages discuss a common descriptive claim in 
the literature that Appleton has herself endorsed, and we are 
not in any way offering the point as a normative argument. In-
deed, in a different passage, we are explicit on the issue: 
There is also a further question of whether the preference for genetic 
children carries forward after adoption, or, as has been demonstrated 
 
 8. Id. at 75–80. 
 9. Id. at 68. 
 10. Cohen & Chen, supra note 1, at 534.  
 11. Id. at 535 (quoting Susan Frelich Appleton, Adoption in the Age of Re-
productive Technology, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 393, 426). 
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with quality of life measures related to disability, whether individuals 
instead “adapt” their evaluations to some extent. Does that adapta-
tion occur for all potential adopted children, or is it less likely to occur 
with, for example, special needs children? If preference “adaptation” 
does take place to some extent, which set of preferences should policy 
makers “count,” the adapted or unadapted ones? An analogous prob-
lem has proven perplexing in the context of allocation debates for 
scarce health resources to prevent disability, that is, whether we 
should allocate resources based on unadapted or adapted quality of 
life estimates for people with disabilities. Finally, there is the ques-
tion of whether the negative effects of being denied genetic reproduc-
tion could successfully be reduced by widespread attempts to de-
emphasize the importance of the genetic connection in parenting. 
Given the long history of this preference and its centrality in many re-
ligious traditions, we think such preference reprogramming is unlike-
ly in the foreseeable future.12 
Second, at several junctures, Appleton and Pollak take is-
sue with our consideration of whether IVF falls within norma-
tive conceptions of health and the state’s obligations to promote 
it. Most notably, they state that: 
By portraying infertility as a health impairment (“deviations [from] 
species-typical normal functioning”), Cohen and Chen naturalize con-
ception, pregnancy, childbirth, and repronormativity itself. Although 
this move helps them arrive at their narrow normative destination, 
this notion of “normal functioning” undercuts arguments for insur-
ance subsidies for contraception, which have encountered some nota-
ble pushback in recent times. And, of course, the legal status of abor-
tion, not to mention abortion subsidies, remains highly contested.13 
We think this misses our argument in two ways. First, 
Norman Daniels’s theory of an obligation to promote health as 
defined as species-typical functioning is offered by us as one of 
five different rationales for covering IVF, alongside Martha 
Nussbaum’s Capabilities Theory, welfarist-consequentialist 
moral theories, disability-rights theories, and narrower health 
outcomes and dollars and cents approaches.14 Thus, one can 
easily support IVF insurance mandates or even a conception of 
infertility as a health care need without necessarily subscribing 
to the species-typical functioning approach. Indeed, we are ex-
plicit about this in our normative discussion of the substitution 
 
 12. Id. at 518; see also id. at 506 (noting the argument “that government 
programs to expand access to IVF have the problematic expressive effect of 
reinforcing the centrality of biological ties for family, or will further under-
mine the self-worth of infertile women who try IVF and fail”). 
 13. Appleton & Pollak, supra note 2, at 71–72 (quoting Cohen & Chen, 
supra note 1, at 517). 
 14. Cohen & Chen, supra note 1, at 501–05. 
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theory where we run the argument twice.15  
Moreover, even if one were committed to the species-typical 
functioning approach it is not clear that it problematically 
“naturalize[s] conception, pregnancy, childbirth, and 
repronormativity itself ” or that it necessarily creates problems 
for Pollak and Appleton’s preferred policy outcomes for abortion 
and contraception.16 Without giving a full articulation or de-
fense of Daniels’s approach, we note at one point in the paper 
that whether some people want or do not want a procedure does 
not determine whether that procedure is truly a health need, 
nor does it affect our obligation to make it available to those 
who do want it.17 It is true that Daniels has acknowledged in 
earlier work that, under his theory, “[n]on-therapeutic abor-
tions do not count as health-care needs, since unwanted preg-
nancy is not a disease,” such that “if medicaid has as its only 
legitimate function the meeting of health-care needs of the 
poor, then we cannot argue for funding abortions as we do for 
funding other medical procedures which treat diseases.”18 How-
ever, as Daniels writes, “if Medicaid should serve other im-
portant goals, like ensuring that poor and well-off women can 
equally well control their bodies, then there is justification for 
funding these abortions,” as well as an argument that not fund-
ing these abortions “will contribute to other health problems 
induced by illegal abortions or by the lack of adequate prenatal 
care for poor, teenaged girls.”19 This rationale for funding these 
abortions makes eminent sense when understood against Dan-
iels’s larger theory: that protecting health is important as a 
way of furthering the larger goal of ensuring that all have ac-
cess to the “normal opportunity range” that is “the array of life 
plans reasonable persons are likely to develop for them-
selves.”20  
Third, in a few places Appleton and Pollak suggest we have 
failed to acknowledge important drawbacks to subsidizing IVF. 
They write that we “assume—in [their] view, rather too readi-
 
 15. See id. at 509–26; see, e.g., id. at 518 (“Now suppose one rejects the 
classification of infertility treatment as part of ‘health,’ or—contrary to Dan-
iels, Nussbaum, and others—rejects the premise that government has any 
special obligations to further the health of its citizens.”). 
 16. Appleton & Pollack, supra note 2, at 71–72. 
 17. Cohen & Chen, supra note 1, at 515–16. 
 18. NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE 31–32 (1985). 
 19. Id. at 32. 
 20. NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH: MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY 
43–46 (2008). 
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ly—that establishing that a procedure promotes health suffices 
to make the case for public subsidies or mandates, without con-
sidering cost as well as benefit,” that “[s]trengthening the theo-
retical foundation for access to IVF, without attending to ques-
tions of contraception and abortion, profoundly threatens 
gender equality, which even liberal feminism embraces.”21 They 
claim that “[t]hese are serious problems for women that extend 
well beyond what Cohen and Chen describe as ‘radical feminist 
critiques of IVF.’”22  
In fact, we do, at several places in our Article, discuss the 
costs of subsidizing IVF apart from effects on adoption. We are 
most explicit in doing so in the portion where we discuss the 
large number of possible reasons other than the substitution 
theory that one might offer against subsidizing IVF. Indeed, 
the last words of the Article are, “the concern about effects on 
adoption is but one reason to oppose these mandates, and we 
leave full examination of other possible reasons to oppose these 
mandates for further work.”23 In the Article itself, we set out 
seven other critiques of subsidizing IVF: (1) that children born 
from IVF are less healthy; (2) that government programs to ex-
pand access to IVF have the problematic expressive effect of re-
inforcing the centrality of biological ties for family or will fur-
ther undermine the self-worth of infertile women who try IVF 
and fail; (3) that on some religious views, IVF problematically 
separates the unitive and the procreative elements of reproduc-
tion within a marriage and/or may lead to embryo destruction; 
(4) that subsidizing health care is inappropriate on libertarian 
grounds; (5) that including IVF in a mandate problematically 
increases health insurance costs and prices some out of the 
market; (6) that satisfying infertility-related needs is inappro-
priate when other health care needs judged more important go 
unmet; and (7) that IVF mandates confuse a health care need 
with the satisfaction of a lifestyle choice.24 We are also very 
clear that we do not think this list is exhaustive.25 Instead, as 
we state fairly directly,  
[f ]or the purpose of this Article we self-consciously put each of these 
objections to one side, acknowledging that if the argument we offer 
here succeeds, these objections will nonetheless persist and their per-
suasiveness will have to be evaluated in further work in order to de-
 
 21. Appleton & Pollak, supra note 2, at 62, 72. 
 22. Id. at 72 (quoting Cohen & Chen, supra note 1, at 506). 
 23. Cohen & Chen, supra note 1, at 577. 
 24. Id. at 505–09.  
 25. Id. at 509 (“There may be other kinds of objections as well.”). 
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termine the ultimate question of whether expanding IVF access 
through insurance mandates is desirable.26 
We go on to say that “[h]ere we instead focus on an objec-
tion from a perspective otherwise open to promoting access to 
health care goods and reducing inequality—the objection that 
focuses on the negative effects these mandates have on adop-
tion.”27 Thus, Appleton and Pollak’s concerns as to equity with 
contraception and abortion—which, we should hasten to add, 
not every reader will find troubling—are, in our view, simply 
an additional set of arguments to be evaluated before reaching 
an all-things-considered view of subsidizing IVF. 
Finally, Appleton and Pollak, in the game-theoretic portion 
of their response, suggest we do not acknowledge the possibility 
of heterogeneous responses to IVF subsidies. They argue that 
“[a] proper analysis of the effect of IVF mandates requires us to 
recognize that infertile couples are heterogeneous in their re-
sources and their preferences and, hence, heterogeneous in 
their responses to IVF mandates.”28 In our conclusion, we sug-
gest just such a possibility, writing: “there may be . . . a ‘two 
solitudes’ effect: individuals have preferences for or against 
domestic adoption that are independent of IVF ’s availability 
such that they will either adopt or refuse to adopt regardless of 
whether or not they have a substitutive method of having chil-
dren.”29 We note that this “is in tension with much of the quali-
tative empirical literature reviewed earlier on adoption 
decisionmaking.”30 Thus, we view Appleton and Pollak’s excel-
lent game theoretic formalization of our suggestion on this 
score as once again complimentary rather than critical. This is 
exactly the kind of future empirical and theoretical work that 
we have hoped our work will launch. 
Small differences in characterization about our project 
should not distract from what we said at the outset: we are 
thrilled by the praise of such leading figures in our fields and 
we think the response beautifully adds to and extends the re-
search agenda we have tried to initiate with our Article. We 
hope that many others follow suit with work as outstanding as 
that of Professors Appleton and Pollak.  
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Appleton & Pollak, supra note 2, at 72–73. 
 29. Cohen & Chen, supra note 1, at 576. 
 30. Id. 
